

Can Defined Contribution Health Insurance Reduce Cost Growth? (and *Save* Employer-Sponsored Health Insurance?)

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Overview

- Recent Trends in ESI that Worry Employers
- How We Got Here: from FFS to DC, via Managed Care
- How DC *COULD* contain cost growth
- Limits on DC's ability to contain cost growth
- Prospects for the future: beyond DC


Worrisome Recent Trends

- Health benefit costs per enrollee
- Rising complexity of health care purchasing
- Responses: Decreasing Employer Share?
- More Decliners => something's wrong with this wage-HI bargain
- Patient Protection backlash . . .

How we got from FFS to DC as a panacea


- cost growth => managed care
- But managed care fell from Grace
- Cost growth is returning (maybe never really went away?)
- Perhaps DC is the next “silver bullet” ?

National Health Spending's Claim on GDP over time



Source: HCFA Office of the Actuary.

Interesting fact about cost growth



Sources: HCFA, NCHS. EROP.

What Drives Cost Growth Anyway?


■ Aging?	2%
■ Insurance?	10-13%
■ Income growth?	5-23%
■ Medical price inflation?	0-20%
■ Defensive medicine?	0%
■ Technology?	50-66+%

Sources: Newhouse; Cutler.

Why Technology Drives Costs

- Increases diagnostic and treatment options
 - ◆ may improve outcomes
 - ◆ we want it! (May not equal to must)
- Affect both volume and price
 - ◆ less invasive => wider use
 - ◆ price effect often increasing in short run
- Complementary effects
 - ◆ upstream and downstream use
 - ◆ longer life / other disease costs

Health Care Cost Growth is World Wide



NHE percent of GDP

Source: NCHS.

Longer term cost growth

■ NHE/person growth (nhe) has exceeded GDP/person growth (gdp) in real terms since 1929

◆ 1940s	nhe - gdp	= 0.9% per year
◆ 1950s		= 2.1% per year
◆ 1960s		= 3.4% per year
◆ 1970s		= 1.5% per year
◆ 1980s		= 2.7% per year
◆ 1990s		= 0.4% per year

Source: Newhouse, HCFA, Economic Report of the President.

Why Managed Care Fell From Grace

- it did what we asked (no good deed . . .)
- utilization management
 - ◆ => patients and providers unhappy
- selective contracting
 - ◆ => providers and patients unhappy
- = double whammy/backlash => Patient Protection Acts
- Cost growth is returning (did it ever leave)?

How cost growth can “hide” for a while

- consider “any” vs. “exclusive” plans.
- suppose $P_{\text{any}} = 110\%$ of P_{exc} .
- suppose both grow at 10% per year
- initial market share is 50-50.
- in year two, 25% switch to lowest cost plan.
- Then measured per worker premium “inflation” = 7.4%, not 10%, which we know it to be!

DC health is not one thing

- theme: shifting choice and responsibility from employer to employee
- Models
 - ◆ simple, cafeteria, multiple employer, non-group
- Design Choices that can't be avoided
 - ◆ loads; selection potential; nature of ER contribution, plan selection/bargaining
- Net Impact: depends on both model and design choices

How DC health insurance *could* work

- DC => workers choose lowest cost plans
- lowest cost plans reduce diffusion, and ultimately development, of new medical devices and techniques, use/focus on cost-effective technologies only
- all plans adopt lower rate of technological change to compete on price with efficient plan

Limits on power of DC to work

- Private health insurance pays for 1/3 of NHE
 - ◆ Medicare plus Medicaid may be more important as standard setters for care/technology purchasers
- Not all workers offered choice of plans (57%)
- 27% of employers who offer use a fixed HI contribution of some type
- Note: no insurer is offering 1960s technology at 1960s prices; can we credibly slow technological growth?

Sources: MEPS; Fronstin, 2001

DC will impart price incentives to choose lowest cost plan

- Elasticity of switching is higher (-2 to -4), but still not huge
- bottom line: cost growth in lowest cost plan
 - ◆ Why might it differ?
 - ◆ can it PROVE that cost-effective care entails using older technologies?
 - ◆ No evidence on this point, maybe lowest cost today are just better at reducing bed days.
 - ◆ There is evidence that markets with high MC have slower adoption rates, => some hope ...

Changing Market Shares of Plan Types


	1988	1993	1996	1999
Conventional	73%	46%	27%	9%
PPO	11%	26%	28%	38%
POS	—	7%	14%	25%
HMO	16%	21%	31%	28%

Source: Levit et al. 2000.


Example to Illustrate Possible Effects of DC

- Two plans, efficient and inefficient
- original market share, 80% inefficient
- growth rates: 4% efficient, 8% inefficient
- switching elasticity = -3 with DC
- switching elasticity = -.5 without DC
- Will show market shares of inefficient plan, average premium growth rates w/ and w/o DC

Market Share of Inefficient Plan, with and without DC and higher switching elasticity



Employer Average Premium Growth Rate, with and without DC and higher switching elasticity



Beyond DC: Prospects for the Future

- Evidence-based health care is our only hope
 - ◆ must prove denial is not life-threatening
- DC can play an important role in imparting incentives to employees
- Incentives for plans and providers are still key
- Accountability/evaluation/monitoring infrastructure is also essential, must be financed, cheaper out of economies of scale